Journal of Experimental Psychology: General

Certain conscious contents--such as the covert name of a viewed object--arise involuntarily and resist suppression, a phenomenon captured by the Reflexive Imagery Task (RIT). Whether a subliminal prime can bias which of two simultaneously present objects captures such an involuntary naming response has not been established. We adapted a two-object RIT into a self-contained, browser-based instrument. Thirty-eight adults (M age = 21.6 years, SD = 2.3; 26 female) viewed 24 object pairs and were instructed to fixate a central cross, to refrain from thinking of the objects names, and to click an object whenever its name intruded into awareness. On each trial a masked prime (17 ms, flanked by pattern masks) was either the exact name of one object (Exact Word Prime), a semantic associate of one object (Semantic Prime), or a neutral string (No Prime), defining a primed side per trial. A post-experiment debriefing confirmed that participants noticed the masks but none consciously perceived or could identify the prime words, indicating that the primes were subliminal. Analyses excluded 91 of 912 trials (10.0%) with more than five clicks. The priming effect was robust across measures: an omnibus comparison of clicks across conditions was significant (Friedman {chi}{superscript 2}(2) = 6.59, p = .037); within both prime conditions participants clicked the primed side more than the not-primed side (Exact Word, p = .039; Semantic, p = .005); and the primed-to-not-primed ratio exceeded parity by roughly 57-59% (Laplace-smoothed ratio {approx} 1.58; one-sample Wilcoxon p < .001 for each). A Bayesian Poisson generalized linear mixed model with random participant intercepts confirmed a credible primed-side advantage (incidence rate ratio = 1.72, 95% credible interval [1.57, 1.90]) that did not differ between prime types. No general left/right response bias emerged. An exploratory ight-side x Exact Word Prime interaction was inconsistent across model classes and is reported as hypothesis-generating. The findings indicate that subliminal lexical and semantic primes can steer the spatial locus of involuntary object naming.

Task demand has a long-standing history in experimental psychology, with numerous investigations of the capacity of different systems and processes under varying cognitive load. Whilst demand is a broadly used term in the literature, it is limited by a lack of cross-domain operationalisation, and thus can be a confound in many inter-domain investigations. To address this, we generated and validated two large-scale, open-source, widely applicable stimuli sets that: (i) can probe a wide, continuous range of objective behaviourally-measured processing demand, and (ii) can be directly matched across two highly contrastive cognitive domains (semantic and visuospatial processing). We normed these tasks in a large, online cohort of healthy adults, enabling future studies to utilise and benefit from reliable baseline measures of demand. Using a matching algorithm that takes into account both speed and accuracy, we then closely paired each semantic judgement trial with a trial of comparable difficulty from the corresponding visuospatial task to produce a cross domain matched set of over 400 items. Finally, we analysed the psycholinguistic and perceptual properties of these stimuli to explore some of the underlying factors driving demand.

Motivational incentives are known to improve working memory (WM) when items differ in value, but whether they enhance performance when all items are equally valued, and if so, by what mechanism, remains unclear. Improvements could reflect enhanced memory-based representations or speed-accuracy trade-offs, whereby incentives promote slower, more cautious responding without improving memory itself. Here, we tested these alternatives across two experiments using an auditory WM task in which incentives varied across trials, but all items on a trial were equally incentivised. In Experiment 1,we allowed participants to resubmit their responses if desired. Reward-related improvements in WM performance were selectively observed when memory load was high, and only at serial positions associated with greater interference. These improvements were also dissociated from systematic response slowing and resubmission behaviour. This indicated that the benefits of incentives were unlikely to be attributable to response caution. Critically, in Experiment 2, motivational benefits persisted under strict response deadlines, where speed cannot be traded for accuracy. Computational modelling showed that reward selectively improved the precision of memory-based responses without reducing guessing. Together, these findings indicate that motivational incentives improve WM by enhancing the quality of memory-based representations, rather than by strategic slowing or altering response strategies.

Resolving the binding problem, i.e., how we integrate perceptual features in space and time to perceive objects, people and events as coherent wholes instead of masses of free-floating features, has been a central goal of cognitive scientists for decades. Conjunction errors occur whenever features are mis-bound leading to illusory percepts that were not actually presented. A specific kind of Rapid Serial Visual Presentation experiment induces temporal illusory conjunctions, called distractor intrusion errors. Despite these errors being well-established, current theories and models provide limited explanations. We present the 2-feature Simultaneous Type/Serial Token (2f-ST2) Model, the latest addition to the family of ST2-models, which simulates the most important behavioural and electrophysiological distractor intrusion findings. These include response distributions, reaction time patterns, and evoked electrophysiology responses. Importantly, we simulate these results across diverse empirical paradigms, implementing a range of stimulus sets, temporal dynamics, and involving multiple responses after each trial, without needing to modify our model's architecture or core parameters. Our findings are discussed in relation to theories of selective attention and working-memory binding. We argue that the 2f-ST2 model is more parsimonious than the leading theory of distractor-intrusions (the focussed-attention/sophisticated-guessing model), since it uses only a single binding mechanism, implying that correct bindings are simply fortunate conjunctions. The 2f-ST2 model further makes predictions for stimulus-competition, subjective-visibility and human electrophysiology. In summary, the ST2-model is a general framework for understanding how perception, temporal attention and working-memory interact, and the 2f-ST2 model extends the framework to distractor intrusions, thus explaining temporal feature binding.

When holding information 'in mind', it is essential that individual objects in working memory remain separated and accessible for guiding behaviour. Space is a well-established organising principle for retaining various features of visual objects in working memory, but whether this spatial organisation is universally applied across all features of visual objects remains unclear. Here, we tested whether two inherently non-spatial features of a visual item, colour and duration, rely on the same spatial organisation of working memory. To track this spatial organisation implicitly, we measured directional biases in microsaccades while participants were cued to select one of two memorised visual items in order to report either its colour or its duration, depending on the session. Crucially, while the visual stimuli were identical between the colour-report and the duration-report sessions, accessing colour information led to a robust spatial microsaccade bias towards the item's original location, whereas this bias was absent when accessing duration. This was corroborated by a significant difference in the spatial bias between the colour and duration sessions. We conclude that the memory organisation for colour and duration is distinct, even when memory regards the exact same visual objects. This implies that the spatial organisation of working memory for visual features is not universal, but feature-dependent.

Bayesian decision theory proposes that people make statistically rational decisions by combining prior knowledge with sensory information (likelihoods). This framework successfully explains many aspects of human behaviour. However, debate persists over whether people perform precise Bayesian computations (i.e., explicit Bayesian strategy) or rely on less demanding strategies - such as approximations or heuristics - that produce Bayesian-like behaviour (i.e., implicit Bayesian strategy). To address this, we examined people's sensitivity to metamers: different prior-likelihood combinations yielding identical optimal policies. An explicit Bayesian observer would show a temporary performance drop immediately after a switch of prior-likelihood combination, followed by recovery, reflecting prior updating. In two studies, we trained participants to estimate hidden target locations drawn from a Gaussian prior. On each trial, scattered dots provided likelihood information. Over time, participants learned the prior and combined it with likelihood information to infer target locations. We then covertly introduced an untrained prior-likelihood metamer. Unlike explicit Bayesian observers, participants' performance declined after the switch and persisted throughout the untrained pair presentation. This finding challenges strict Bayesian interpretations of task performance and suggests that participants rely instead on likelihood-sensitive strategy that is neither explicit Bayesian nor does it not fully integrate prior information. Our study demonstrates how metamer manipulations can distinguish behaviour that merely appears Bayesian, from behaviour genuinely produced by Bayesian computations, and calls for the use of metamers for ruling out alternative explanations of Bayesian-like behaviours.

Reflecting how we organize visual experience in everyday memory, visual working memory is increasingly understood as a system in which individual item representations are organized within structures rather than maintained in isolation. Among these, relational structure may be especially consequential because, by specifying how one item value lies relative to another within a feature space, it could allow information about one remembered value to constrain which values are plausible for the other. Yet demonstrating such constraint is challenging because item-specific mnemonic evidence and relational evidence ordinarily support essentially the same estimate. We broke this equivalence with biased post-encoding feedback for one item, making item-specific and relation-based predictions for the other diverge. Across three experiments, participants remembered two sequentially presented orientations, with feedback for one shifted slightly clockwise or counterclockwise from its actual value. Participants incorporated this bias into memory for the feedback-provided orientation; critically, it also appeared in reports of the other orientation, which received no feedback, in the direction predicted by the signed angular offset linking the two remembered values. This feedback transfer weakened with increasing angular separation but occurred in both directions between the first and second orientations. These findings show that relational structure directly constrains individual value estimates in visual working memory, even for items encountered separately. By dissociating normally coincident item-specific and relation-based predictions, our approach reveals an otherwise hidden relational contribution. A probabilistic account explains these findings through joint inference from uncertain item-specific and relational evidence, with their relative uncertainties governing transfer strength.

Recent research has suggested that the availability of non-instrumental information about the outcome of a risky choice increases risk appetite. In this study, we aimed to perform a conceptual replication of these findings and to examine the cognitive mechanisms underlying this effect. Across two experiments (N = 150, 102), we presented participants with mathematically fair gambles and allowed them to choose the size of their bet. Between trials, we varied the presence of non-instrumental information that would reveal the outcome ahead of time. In both experiments, we did not find consistent evidence for an effect of the availability of non-instrumental information on bet size. These findings suggest that the previously reported effects of non-instrumental information on risk appetite may have been an idiosyncratic feature of experimental design, rather than a more general phenomenon that characterises human decision making under risk.

Mice are widely used to study the neural basis of perceptual decision-making, often with the ultimate goal of extrapolating insights to humans. Yet, whether humans and mice rely on similar computational strategies remains rarely tested, partly because the two species acquire knowledge differently. Animals learn from experience, while humans usually receive verbal task instructions. Here, we explicitly contrast these modes of learning in humans who perform a perceptual decision-making task adapted from a standardized rodent task. Specifically, we present an open behavioral dataset from 80 human participants who performed 600 trials of a visual contrast-discrimination task, matched to the standardized International Brain Laboratory task for mice (International Brain Laboratory et al., 2021, 2025). Participants either received verbal instructions ('Instructed') or were only told to discover the rules of the task by playing ('Uninstructed'). The dataset contains choices, response times, continuous cursor trajectories, eye-tracking and pupil recordings. Descriptive analyses show that Uninstructed participants were less accurate and had higher lapse rates than Instructed participants. They improved over the first 200 trials, approaching the performance of Instructed participants. These data provide a benchmark for testing whether computational strategies identified in mice also describe human behavior.

Searching for objects of interest is an essential and pervasive activity in adaptive cognition. In everyday situations, we often search for relevant content in our surroundings and in mind at the same time, yet most experimental tasks consider search behavior in perception or in working memory separately. To address the gap, we designed tasks to investigate perceptual and working-memory search proceeding in tandem. Participants viewed successive arrays of two real-world objects, separated by a delay, and then were prompted to search for a specific object, while the second array remained visible. The probed target was equally likely to be in the previously encoded array, available only in working memory, or in the visible array. Behavioral performance across four experiments with different response demands and delays yielded a consistent pattern of findings. Accuracy was better for detecting perceptual targets than working-memory targets. However, search speed was equivalent for targets in both domains in all cases, suggesting parallel search functions co-existing across the two domains. The final experiment combined continuous color reproduction with eye tracking and neural recordings. Neural measures of posterior alpha lateralization, tracking the neural selection of working-memory and perceptual targets, suggested parallel search functions developing with similar time courses. Intriguingly, oculomotor gaze shifts showed a divergent pattern, with earlier gaze shifts associated with perceptual targets and later shifts with working-memory targets. Overall, the present studies establish a means for investigating search across working-memory and perceptual domains, suggest the co-existence of parallel search mechanisms, and invite new lines of enquiry.

Spontaneous eye blinks have long been linked to cognitive processing, yet how task demands shape blink timing and its relationship to behavioral performance remains unclear. We examined spontaneous blink behavior in 576 adults performing two variants of the Continuous Performance Task (CPT). Blink occurrence and timing were most strongly modulated by the experimental condition in the more demanding CPT-AX task, whereas their association with response time was stronger in the CPT-X task, where more consistent blink timing predicted faster responses. This dissociation suggests that task structure changes not only blink behavior but also the behavioral relevance of blink timing. These findings are consistent with an adaptive scheduling account of spontaneous blinking and provide a conceptual framework for understanding when and why blink timing contains chronometric information about ongoing cognition.

Recalling scenes and events depends on how information is relationally organised in memory, but it is unclear whether the organisation of eye movements during encoding, rather than simply how much is explored, shapes what is remembered. Using a scene-viewing paradigm and drawing-based free recall task to capture the content and structure of remembered scenes, we examined whether scene memory was better explained by 'lower-order' measures reflecting the magnitude and spatial extent of sampling, or 'higher-order' measures capturing gaze organisation and temporal dynamics. Relative to lower-order measures (number of fixations and scanpath length), memory precision was better predicted by repeated sampling of viewed regions (refixations) and gaze distributions (stationary gaze entropy) during encoding. Thus, the organisation of visual attention, rather than sampling quantity, contributed to scene representations that preserved relationships between elements. These findings highlight a role for spatial gaze dynamics in optimally encoding organised, relational scene representations for episodic memory.

The Sense of Agency (SoA), the experience of being in control of ones own actions, is thought to emerge from the comparison of internal sensorimotor predictions with afferent feedback. Classical comparator models treat SoA as arising from a prediction-feedback comparison. Volitional action likely engages multiple forward models that predict distinct features of an outcome, such as its timing and spatial trajectory. Whether prediction errors arising from these distinct forward models are integrated into a domain-general representation of agency, and if so by what computational logic, remains unresolved. We addressed this question using a Virtual Reality reaching task. Participants observed a virtual hand replicating their movements while we independently manipulated two sensorimotor domains: temporal delay and spatial angle deviation, in isolation and in factorial combinations. After each trial, participants made an SoA judgment. We examined whether SoA responses show computational hallmarks of integration between different features of sensorimotor prediction. Specifically, we pre-registered three computational models (Multiplicative, Minimum, and Mean) and compared their fit to per-trial responses. Across an exploratory sample (N = 16) and a pre-registered replication (N = 38), SoA declined monotonically with conflict magnitude in both domains. Critically, a Multiplicative integration rule consistently outperformed the Minimum and Mean rules. These results provide direct evidence for domain-general integration between prediction errors in SoA, governed by a multiplicative computational logic.

Recognising people precedes and informs most social interactions, yet it is not clear why individuals differ so markedly in face recognition ability. Exposure-based accounts propose that it is shaped by visual experience with faces, known as 'face diet', but most prior work treats exposure as passively acquired, thereby masking the active and dynamic nature of visual attention in natural settings. Here we examined whether spontaneous attention to faces in everyday environments predicts face recognition ability. Eighty participants wore mobile eye-tracking glasses while walking through a busy university campus and during a face-to-face interaction, before completing standard measures of face recognition ability. Fixations directed to faces showed stable individual differences in both settings. People who looked more at faces scored higher on our composite measure of face recognition ability, and gaze in the two settings predicted ability independently, together accounting for 22% of its variance. These findings suggest that differences in how people actively sample visual information from their environments may be an overlooked source of variance in perceptual expertise.

How cognitive control influences the correction of motor errors is an important question. In this study, we examined how the slow and fast processes that constitute motor adaptation are modulated by cognitive load. To address this question, we used a novel approach that differed from traditional dual-task experiments that have assessed the role of fast processes by decreasing attention to the motor adaptation task. Here, cognitive load was manipulated using a decision-making task with easy and hard difficulty levels, while simultaneously adapting to a perturbation and maintaining attention on the task. Our results showed that the hard decision-making task increased cognitive load relative to the easy task, resulting in attenuated steady-state learning. The relative contributions of the fast and slow components were assessed using a dual state-space model, which showed that the former was larger under the high-load condition, whereas the latter was larger under the easy-load condition, consistent with a competition model in which a shared error signal is partitioned between the two processes. We also showed that the effect of cognitive load on fast processes was not attributable to increased reaction times or task performance. Taken together, these results support the notion that faster explicit motor adaptation processes derive from cognitive processes involved in action selection.

Learning to reach with a visuomotor distortion has been shown to influence subsequent reaches with the same distortion and with a new distortion. Here, we examined whether learning to reach with a small 20{degrees} mirror reversed distortion leads to faster re-learning of the same distortion (i.e., demonstrates savings) and whether learning to reach with a mirror reversed distortion influences subsequent reaches with a 20{degrees} visuomotor rotation distortion. Thirty participants first learned to reach with the mirror reversed distortion. Following washout trials with aligned cursor feedback, 15 participants reached again with the mirror reversed distortion (MR-MR group), while the 15 other participants reached with a visuomotor rotation distortion (MR-VMR group). An additional twenty participants only reached with the visuomotor rotation distortion (VMR-only group). Implicit (unconscious) and explicit (conscious strategy) contributions to learning were assessed using the process dissociation procedure. Evidence of savings was evident in the MR-MR group, such that participants demonstrated reduced hand angles when re-introduced to the mirror reversed distortion. This savings was driven by explicit processes, consistent with the rapid retrieval of previously acquired task solutions. Additionally, learning to reach with the mirror reversed distortion interfered with learning to reach with the visuomotor rotation distortion, such that the MR-VMR group demonstrated increased reach variability and longer reaction times when reaching with the visuomotor rotation distortion compared to the VMR-only group. Reduced implicit contributions were also evident in the MR-VMR group compared to the VMR-only group. Together, results indicate that learning to reach with a mirror reversed distortion promotes savings and influences learning to reach with a visuomotor rotation distortion through engagement of explicit processes.

Attentional selection not only increases behavioural performance and neural information for attended stimuli but, in some instances, induces changes in stimulus appearance. While reported appearance changes have mostly concerned the effects of attending to a particular spatial location, here we report a shift in appearance that occurs when attention is directed to one component of a stimulus rapidly alternating at a single spatial location. Our stimuli included two frames of different colors, which alternated at 3.75Hz or 7.5Hz. Participants reported the perceived dominance of one frame's color in the reference stimulus, by comparison with a target stimulus. We found that when one stimulus frame was more salient than the other, with a greater likelihood of capturing exogenous attention, there was an illusory perception that the frame was physically present for a greater proportion of time. When the frames were matched in salience, a task encouraging participants to endogenously direct their attention to one frame produced a smaller shift in appearance. Our results add to the body of literature demonstrating that attention can change appearance, in this case altering the appearance of attended versus unattended stimuli that are presented at the same spatial location. Furthermore, our results demonstrate that at the 'temporal transparent' alternation rate of 7.5Hz, where rapidly alternating stimuli are perceived as two translucent surfaces, attentional selection of one surface can account for the apparent paradox that feature conjunctions are perceived at stimulus alternation rates higher than predicted by the temporal limits of feature binding for other stimuli.

The attentional blink is a well-known phenomenon illustrating the limitations of human attention: When two visual targets are presented in rapid succession, identification of the second target is often impaired. While the attentional blink is known to attenuate when targets share perceptual features or category membership, real-world objects are also linked through contextual associations, shaped by objects typically occurring within the same environments. Here, we devised an attentional blink experiment in which we orthogonally manipulated contextual and categorical relationships between the two targets while controlling for their perceptual similarity. As the key result, contextual associations facilitated identification of the second target but impaired identification of the first target. These findings suggest that contextual associations yield distinct benefits and costs for visual cognition, where enhanced attentional access to subsequent targets is traded off against increased interference between targets.

In mirror reversed (MR) learning, the magnitude and direction of the visuomotor distortion varies with target location. To date, implicit (i.e., unconscious) processes have not been implicated in learning to reach with an MR distortion, even when the distortion is small in magnitude. Across two experiments, we examined whether explicit processes (i.e., motor and perceptual awareness of reaching strategies) are engaged when learning to reach with a small (20{degrees}) MR distortion and whether this learning generalizes to novel targets. Learning to reach with an MR distortion was compared to learning to reach with a small visuomotor rotation (VR), in which cursor feedback was rotated 20{degrees} relative to hand motion at each target. Participants in the MR group engaged both motor and perceptual awareness and learning to reach with the MR distortion generalized to novel targets. Participants in the VR group also learned to reach with the VR distortion but they did not engage either motor or perceptual awareness and there was no evidence of generalization. Reaction times were longer for the MR group compared to the VR group, consistent with engagement of explicit processes. Together, these findings suggest that learning to reach with an MR distortion is supported by motor and perceptual awareness that generalize to novel targets.

Mistakes make up our daily lives. Once a mistake has been committed, it is common to pause before you continue. This slowing is called post-error slowing (PES). Although several theories have been proposed to account for PES in humans, findings across cognitive tasks show variation in how PES occurs, and it is unclear how this phenomenon may translate across modalities to a key model organism of human cognition, macaque monkeys. To determine whether monkeys exhibit PES, we tested three rhesus macaque monkeys in components of cognitive sequential decision-making tasks that used either eye tracking or touch screens to report responses. Here we show that monkeys exhibit non-adaptive, error type-dependent PES across modalities. Task structure and context also modulated PES in the eye tracking task, and no modality improved task performance following PES. These results suggest that monkey PES is a combination of cognitive and non-cognitive related responses to error that are modulated by task structures such as error type and task context. Overall, the flexibility in monkey PES is comparable to that of humans, further supporting the importance of monkeys as a translational model in investigating the mechanisms of PES.